Abstract. This paper describes new algorithms for computing a modular inverse e −1 mod f given coprime integers e and f . Contrary to previously reported methods, we neither rely on the extended Euclidean algorithm, nor impose conditions on e or f . The main application of our gcd-free technique is the computation of an RSA private key in both standard and CRT modes based on simple modular arithmetic operations, thus boosting real-life implementations on crypto-accelerated devices.
Introduction
The usual way one computes a modular inverse is by applying the extended Euclidean algorithm [8, Algorithm X, p. 325] . Given e and f on input, this algorithm returns integers α and β such that αe + βf = gcd(e, f ). Assuming that e is relatively prime to f , and therefore that e has an inverse modulo f , it follows that αe ≡ 1 (mod f ) meaning that α ≡ e −1 (mod f ).
Unfortunately, for code-optimization reasons, this algorithm is hardly available on embedded platforms. Instead, algebraic tricks based on simple modular arithmetic are highly preferred because gcd-type calculations may be too intricate to handle on cryptoprocessors compared to modular operations. As an example, executing an extended binary gcd may require much less arithmetic or logic operations on large numbers than glue instructions such as register switches, loop control, pointer management, etc., rendering this approach comparatively prohibitive to straightforward, arithmetic-only implementations. But then, one requires that one of the two input values, e or f , is prime. Indeed, when f is prime, the inverse of e modulo f is given by Fermat Little Theorem stat-ing that e −1 ≡ e f −2 (mod f ); when e is prime, e −1 mod f is given by Arazi's well-known inversion formula. 1 Little is known about the other cases.
This paper presents simple ways for computing e −1 mod f without the (extended) Euclidean algorithm (or variants thereof) and without any restrictions on e or f . Our techniques only invoke usual basic operations like (possibly modular) additions, multiplications and exponentiations. Since these operations are optimized on devices supporting public-key cryptography, the technique we propose is especially well-suited for smart-card on-board computation of an RSA private key, in both standard and CRT modes.
Arazi's Inversion Formula
When f is prime, the inverse of e modulo f is given by Fermat Little Theorem
When f is not prime and provided that e is prime, the usual trick consists in applying Arazi's inversion formula, which expresses e −1 mod f in terms of f −1 mod e.
Lemma 1 (Arazi)
. Let e and f be two positive integers. If gcd(e, f ) = 1 then
Proof. Define U = e(e −1 mod f ) + f (f −1 mod e). Since U ≡ 1 (mod e) and U ≡ 1 (mod f ), it follows that U ≡ 1 (mod ef ). Hence, noting that 1 < e + f ≤ U < 2ef , this implies that U = 1 + ef , or equivalently that e
Hence if e is prime, its inverse d modulo f can easily be computed as
This formula is limited to prime values for e, but is easily extended to
whenever λ(e) is known. We recall that computing Carmichael's function λ(e) from e requires to factor e, a task which imposes a very strong computational requirement. So, the extended technique given by Eq. (2) is of no interest if the inversion algorithm is not given λ(e) as an input. The same remarks are independently stated in [6] .
Implementing Arazi's Formula with Modular Operations
Equation (2) Note that all operations involved here are modular. Besides, this technique turns out to be extremely fast (only 10 iterations for a typical size |f | = 1024), especially for small values of e.
The Case of Composite Numbers
In the sequel, Π will always denote the product of small primes Π = i∈I p i for I ⊂ N and where p i is the i th prime (i.e., p 1 = 2, p 2 = 3, . . . ). Unless stated otherwise, we assume that I = [1, k] for a certain bound k depending on the context of use for Π. We also assume that the choice for Π has been done once and for all, and that Π and λ(Π) are absolute constants coded in our algorithms. Now suppose that f is some composite number with unknown factorization. We consider different scenarios depending on the information we have about the operand e:
1. e is known at compile time. We thus have access to λ(e) which may be written or coded in the program itself; 2. e is an input data and is provided along with λ(e); 3. e is provided alone, but is known to be prime (and thus λ(e) = e − 1); 4. e is given (e.g., dynamically loaded and provided) but nothing else is known about e.
The first three situations lead to the implementation given below. The fourth context of use is somewhat more intricate and requires a specific treatment as shown later in Section 3.
We adopt the following twofold approach:
-one attempts to retrieve λ(e), or a multiple thereof, in order to invoke the previous, very efficient technique; -if unsuccessful, one computes d without that knowledge but in an heavier, somewhat pathological way.
In some cases, retrieving λ(e) may be quite efficient. When e is smooth enough so that e | Π, then a multiple of λ(e) is simply λ(Π). This may also hold without necessarily having e | Π. In many situations, the following will be sufficient. Set
and execute the inversion algorithm of the previous section by replacing λ(e) − 1 by λ − 1. Get the result d and test whether e d ≡ 1 (mod f ). We output d if this equality holds. Otherwise, we know that the structure of e is less simple than originally thought.
2
The next section describes new efficient approaches that always return the value of d = e −1 mod f whatever the conditions on e and/or f .
Extended Algorithms for Composite Integers

Algorithm 1
Our idea is fairly simple. It is based on the somewhat obvious observation that
for any integer C. Therefore we can add an appropriate multiple of f to e so that the result is prime and then apply Arazi's inversion formula directly to it. Defineê = e + Cf .
We requireê to be a prime. A naive way to find such anê consists in trying C = 1, 2, . . . and so on until e+Cf is prime [4] . We can however do much better.
Proposition 1.
Let e and f be two positive integers with gcd(e, f ) = 1. Let also Π = p i be a product of (small) primes. Definê
Then we have gcd(ê, Finally, asê ≡ e (mod f ), it follows that gcd(ê, f ) = gcd(e, f ) = 1.
Asê is co-prime to all small primes p i | Π, it is likely to be a prime number which we can test using some primality test.
3 If the test is unsuccessful, we reiterate the process with another candidateê (new) =ê (old) +fΠ, and so forth until e is a prime number. Remark that the updatedê,ê
(mod {p i , f}) and so also verifies Proposition 1.
We note that our technique differs from the one described in [7] in several ways, and in particular, the building ofê from e is not probabilistic. The resulting algorithm is detailed on Fig. 2 .
Input: e, f with gcd(e, f ) = 1 There may exist variations of Algorithm 1. To illustrate the diversity of our technique, we provide here another alternative. We state: 
Then gcd( e, p i ) = 1 for all p i dividing Π.
Proof. (i) Consider first the case gcd(f, p i ) = p i . Then from Eq. (5) we have e ≡ e (mod p i ). Moreover, since by definition gcd(e, f ) = 1, it follows that gcd(ê, p i ) = 1.
(ii) Suppose now that gcd(f, p i ) = 1. Then Eq. (5) yieldsê ≡ c (mod p i ) and thus we find again gcd( e, p i ) = 1 since c ∈ Z * Π .
As e is co-prime to all small primes p i | Π, it is likely a prime number. Otherwise we re-iterate the process with another candidate c ∈ Z * Π . Again, note that all operations in the above algorithm exclusively rely on basic modular arithmetic. If the cryptoprocessor cannot handle integer divisions directly, the division by e in the last step can be computed with the algorithm described in Fig. 1. 
Input: f , e, Π, and a
∈ Z * Π \ {1} Output: d f 1. Compute U ← f λ(Π)−1 mod Π 2. Set C ← [(c − e)U
Algorithm 2
A second algorithm can be derived by exchanging the roles of e and f in Proposition 1. Doing so, we obtain a primef . Two applications of Arazi's formula will give thus the expected result.
Sincef is prime, the inverse of e modulof is given by u = ef −2 modf . Noting that f ≡f (mod e), a first application of Arazi's formula enables to recover the value of f −1 mod e as
and a second application yields
In many cases, the value of e is small compared to that of f . Moreover, using the fact that gcd(e, f ) = gcd(e mod f, e), we obtain the following corollary of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. With the notations of Proposition 1, defineē = e mod f and
Then we have gcd(ê, p i ) = 1 for all primes p i dividing Π. Moreover, we have gcd(ê, f ) = 1.
Proof. Straightforward by replacing e withē in Proposition 1.
Therefore, we can advantageously considerf instead of f (remember that for our second algorithm the roles of e and f are exchanged in Proposition 1) and so evaluate v in Eq. (6) as
Putting all together, we obtain a second algorithm for computing modular inverses.
Input: e, f with gcd(e, f ) = 1 This second algorithm is particularly efficient when e is small since then Π may be chosen smaller, which in turn implies smaller values forC and forf . On the contrary, the first algorithm (Fig. 2) is more suitable when the size of e is sensibly the same as that of f .
As easily seen, the choice for parameter Π remains completely free. We now discuss the best way to choose Π in practice. Primality checks executed in our 'while' loop involve integers of bitsize close to |eΠ|. As most practical implementations for primality testing are of cubic complexity, a single test has a cost ∝ |eΠ| 3 . Moreover, the average number of tests amounts to |eΠ| · ln 2 · φ(lcm(e, Π)) lcm(e, Π) .
Totalling these two facts, and upper bounding the ratio φ(lcm(e, Π))/ lcm(e, Π) by φ(Π)/Π, the average workfactor for findingf is bounded by a function proportional to (|eΠ|) 4 φ(Π)/Π. Therefore, provided that Π = k 1 p i , an optimal choice for k with respect to a given |e| is easily found. Interestingly, for small parameter lengths such as |e| = 32 or 64, the optimum is obtained for k = 3 (Π = 2 · 3 · 5), i.e., for an extremely small value of Π. Algorithm 2 then performs only a few primality checks over integers of size close to the one of e, and is therefore very fast.
Remark 1.
Certain hardware implementations return the value of f div e together with the value of f mod e when computing the remainder of an integer division. In this case, the division by ef in the expression of d (cf. [ ‡] in Fig. 3) can be reduced to a division byf . InitializingC to 0 and keeping track of its accumulated value, we can replace Line [i] bȳ
and
4 Application to RSA RSA [11] , named after its inventors Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, is undoubtedly the most widely used cryptosystem. We give hereafter a short description and refer the reader to the original paper or any textbook on cryptography for further details.
Let n = pq be the product of two large primes. We let e and d denote a matching pair of public exponent/private exponent, according to
where λ is Carmichael function. In particular, for the RSA, we have n = pq and λ(n) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1). Given x ∈ ]0, n[, the public operation (e.g., encryption of a message or verification of a signature) consists in raising x to the power e, modulo n, i.e., in computing c = x e mod n. Next, from c, the corresponding private operation (e.g., decryption of a ciphertext or a signature generation) is c d mod n. From the definition of e and d, we obviously have that c d ≡ x (mod n).
Standard Mode
In standard mode, on input p, q and e, one has to compute the private exponent d satisfying Eq. (7). We assume that we are given Π, the product of small primes, along with λ(Π). These numbers are pure constants, and are thus easily hardcoded into the implementation. When e (or its factorization) cannot be determined in advance, a direct application of Algorithm 1 (or Algorithm 2) with e and f = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) on input will output the corresponding secret key d.
If the value of lcm(p − 1, q − 1) cannot be computed, one can replace the Carmichael function of n by the Euler totient function and take f = (p−1)(q−1). This, however, results in a larger yet valid value for d.
From a computational viewpoint, taking |f | = 1024 and |e| = 32 for instance, a typical implementation of Algorithm 2 would use the specific choice Π = 2·3·5. Thus, around 6.83 primality tests over 37-bit numbers are required, on average. When |f | = 1024 and e = 64, the same choice for Π yields an average of 12.75 primality tests over 69-bit numbers. In addition to that, operations starting and ending the algorithm are almost negligible: computingC amounts to a few squares modulo 2 · 3 · 5; u requires an exponentiation of size close to |e|; and the computation of d (thanks to our technique on Fig. 1 ) boils down to a few multiplications carried out modulo 2 1024 .
CRT Mode
The private operation can be speeded up through Chinese remaindering (CRT mode) [9] . The computations are performed modulo p and q and then recombined. The private parameters are (p, q,
where x p = c dp mod p and x q = c dq mod q. The expected speed-up factor is 4, compared to the standard (i.e., non-CRT) mode.
In CRT mode, the procedure is readily the same. We apply Algorithm 1 or 2 where inputs e and f are initialized to e (mod (p − 1)) and p − 1, respectively. This yields the value of the private exponent d p . Similarly, the exponent d q is obtained by initializing e and f to e (mod (q − 1)) and q − 1, respectively.
Standard Mode (II)
There is another way to compute the private key in standard mode. We first compute d p and d q as described in the previous section. Next, letting Q := q − 1 and Λ := λ(n)/(q − 1), we compute the inverse of Q modulo Λ, say I Q , thanks to the algorithm of Fig. 2 as 
Conclusion
We devised new algorithms for computing modular inverses in a gcd-free manner. We stress that, implementing our techniques, an RSA key generation process can be executed on any given crypto-enhanced embedded processor in almost every circumstances.
